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INCREASES IN LABOR DEMAND CAN SIGNIFICANTLY 
REDUCE POVERTY, BOTH IN SHORT-RUN AND LONG- 
RUN
  In short-run, a shock to local labor demand that 
reduces unemployment by 1 % reduces poverty 
rate by 7/10ths of 1 %. (Bartik f 1996; Tobin, 
1994)
  In long-run, an increase in local employment of 
10% increases labor force participation rates by 
2% and advances individuals to occupations that 
pay 2% more. Earnings effects are greater in 
percentage terms for less-skilled.(Unemployment 
rates and occupational real wages are unaffected.) 
(Bartik, 1993a, 1991)
  During Boston boom from 1980-88, black family 
poverty in Boston dropped from 29% to 13% 
(Osterman,1991).
KEY FEATURES OF THE LOW-WAGE LABOR MARKET
  Many disadvantaged persons without jobs can, if 
given a chance and minimal training, be as 
productive as the current work force. Many 
disadvantaged persons with jobs could work 
productively at higher wage jobs.
Evidence:
  Demand studies previously cited,
  YIEPP program from 1978-81 suggested that 
increased demand can make black youth employment 
rates similar to those of whites, and that 80% of 
employers are satisfied with the productivity of these 
extra workers. (Farkas et al, 1982; Ball et al, 1981)
KEY FEATURES OF THE LOW-WAGE LABOR MARKET
  Employers have poor information about
productivity of those they hire, which contributes 
to inefficiency and discrimination in the hiring 
process.
Evidence:
  In small and medium-sized firms, more than one- 
quarter of new hires are less than 75% as productive 
as expected (Bishop, 1993).
  Interview studies: many employers reluctant to hire 
disadvantaged f particularly black males from ghetto 
(Kirschenman and Neckerman, 1991). Audit studies 
confirm discrimination (Fix and Struyk, 1992).
  Temporary help agencies and temp-to-perm hiring is 
market response to imperfect information about hires.
KEY FEATURES OF THE LOW-WAGE LABOR MARKET
— Labor demand shocks can have long-run effects by 
improving credentials, skills, and self-esteem.
Evidence:
  Demand studies previously cited.
  In ongoing research, I find for high school dropouts 
that 40-50% of a positive earnings shock will persist 
for at least five years.
  Supported Work program: Experimental findings 
indicate that effects of this program persisted without 
much depreciation up to 8 years later. (Couch, 1992)
KEY FEATURES OF THE LOW-WAGE LABOR MARKET
  Labor markets are probably more closely
approximated by metropolitan areas than by the 
nation or the neighborhood.
Evidence:
  Controlling for metropolitan labor market conditions, 
national variables have the wrong sign or are 
insignificant in explaining local wages and employment 
rates (Bartik, 1994; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994).
  In explaining the poor's employment, "job access" 
falls in significance when other neighborhood variables 
are added. (O'Regan and Quigley, 1996).
  Firm location affects who is hired for firms that use 
help wanted signs, not firms that use newspaper ads 
(Holzer and Ihlanfeldt, 1996).
  In explaining black earnings, metropolitan growth 
dominates central city county growth(Bartik, 1993b).
  Ghettos near downtown often have employment 
problems (Ellwood,1986;Bartik et al, 1994).
  Inner city residents who move to suburbs cite lower 
crime, not just job access, as explaining why their 
employment increased (Rosenbaum and Popkin, 1991).
KEY FEATURES OF THE LOW-WAGE LABOR MARKET
— Taxes do matter to labor demand, but one has to 
worry about stigma effects due to tax subsidies for 
hiring the disadvantaged.
Evidence:
  Numerous studies show that taxes have important 
effects on labor demand at MSA or state level, and 
very large effects on labor demand at different 
locations within an MSA. (Bartik, 1991, 1992, 1995)
  In YIEPP program (1978-81), 18% of firms willing to 
participate at 100% wage subsidy, 10% at 75% 
subsidy, 5% at 50% subsidy (Ball et al, 1981).
  One experiment suggests that hire rates are lower 
for welfare recipients who inform employers of wage 
subsidy offer (13% hire rate vs. 21 % for control 
group). (Burtless, 1985)
  Evaluations of Targeted Jobs Tax Credit give mixed 
results (Katz, 1996).
VISIONARY BUT INFEASIBLE IDEAS
• Increase macro labor demand by general
employment subsidies. (Phelps et al, 1994; Layard 
et al, 1991).
• Regional policy: explicit federal policy for helping 
local economies with weak labor demand.
• Public service jobs
THREE KEY FEATURES OF PROPOSED PROGRAM
• Job development intermediary to provide 
information, job matching, and job retention 
services to both selected employers and 
disadvantaged clients.
• Discretionary wage subsidies awarded as needed 
by job developers to selected employers for hiring 
disadvantaged clients.
• Extra wage subsidies for net new jobs in export- 
base sector of local economy, when disadvantaged 
clients are hired.
LESSONS FROM SIMILAR PROGRAMS
PROGRAM DESCRIPTION RESULT
GET (Center for
Employment
Training)
Job training program that 
includes job development
Most successful job training 
program ever evaluated using 
random assignment (U.S. 
DOL, 1995)
Riverside 
County (CA) 
GAIN program
Welfare-to-work program 
with heavy emphasis on job 
development
One of most successful 
welfare-to-work programs 
ever evaluated using random 
assignment. (Riccio et al, 
1994)
JTPA-OJT On-the-job-training subsidy 
paid to employer; job 
development usually a 
component.
JTPA experiment indicates 
OJT successful for both adult 
women and men(Orr et al, 
1996). Recent reforms have 
made OJT harder to use.
America Works Private for-profit welfare-to- 
work program in New York 
City and other cities; heavy 
emphasis on job 
development, some subsidies 
received by America Works
Success much touted, but has 
never been rigorously 
evaluated.
MEED 
(Minnesota 
Employment and 
Economic 
Development)
Program active from 1983- 
89; provided $4 per hour 
wage subsidy to businesses 
creating new jobs for 
disadvantaged persons, with 
preferences for export-based 
small businesses.
No rigorous evaluations, but 
surveys of assisted firms 
indicate that 55-60% claim 
would not have created the 
jobs without the subsidy. This 
percentage is higher for 
smaller firms. (Jobs Now 
Coalition, 1988)
Portland 
(Oregon) JobNet
Firms receiving economic 
development subsidies from 
Portland are required to 
consider referrals from 
JobNet, a consortium of 
trainers and community 
groups.
No evaluation
ISSUES AND TENTATIVE ANSWERS
• Wage subsidy rate and length of time: 6-months; $2/hr. for 
vacancies, $5/hr. for new jobs.
• Location of job: No restriction.
• Location of residents: EZ/EC residents?
• Size of program: 16 million poor, ages 18-64, who do not work 
full-time. 500,000 jobs would cost $1.75 billion in tax credits if 
half jobs are new (cost per job is $3500). If each job developer 
annually places 30-60 persons,and costs $45,000, then job 
development intermediary costs $375-$750 million ($750-$ 1500 
per placement).
• Targeting types of jobs: Favor small business.
• Who controls funds: Distributed by feds to local Service Delivery 
Areas/Workforce Development Boards based on competitive 
application process.
• Local administration: Possible subcontracting to wide variety of 
organizations; random assignment?
• Accountability: Future grant applications depend on past 
placements and retention, net new jobs created.
• Financing: Work Opportunity Tax Credit is $380 million per year, 
new welfare tax credit is $120 million. Local match?
• Relationship to welfare reform: Consider incentives to ensure 
some help for adult males and youths.
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